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Abstract
The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)
is a constituent of the Franc Zone (FZ), whose roots may be traced back
to 1901 when France created the West African Bank. Since its incep-
tion, FZ’s monetary authorities’ objective and monetary policy instru-
ments have been evolving. Nevertheless, some FZ’s features have en-
dured, namely the fixed exchange rate between that monetary union’s
common currency (CFAF) and France’s currency, the free capital mobil-
ity between Franc Zone countries (FZC) and France, the ceiling on the
monetary budget financing and the obligation of FZC to entrust a share of
their foreign exchange reserves to the French Treasury in exchange for
the convertibility of CFAF into France’s currency. Using Cameroon’s
data over 1979 and 2014, we estimate a DSGE model of a small open
economy model that take into account some of those features. We find
that technology and fiscal shocks drive the bulk of economic fluctuations.
Key Words: Franc Zone - Cameroon - DSGE model - Metropolis-
Hasting
JEL Classification: C68 E32 F41 F45
1 Introduction
The Franc Zone (FZ) is constituted by the Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC) and the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)1.
Until the 1972 Accord, no contractual agreement had defined the tools and the goals of
monetary policy in the Franc Zone countries (FZC). The 1972 Accord led to the cre-
ation of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) which subsequently presided over
the amount of loan to be extended to specific sectors of economy such as agricultural
and foreign oriented sectors by setting a ceiling to commercial banks’ refinancing.
In the nineteen-eighties, the FZC went through a deep economic, banking and ex-
1 The CEMAC is made up of six countries: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Re-
public of), Equatorial Guinea and, Gabon. The members of the WAEMU are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and, Togo.
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change rate crisis. Eventually, a maxi-devaluation of their common currency, the CFAF,
was decided in January 1994 and the direct management of loans to the private sector
was discontinued. The CEMAC was created in the same year and became operational
after the ratification of the treaty by all its members in 1999.
Since then, under the aegis of the French Treasury and the Banque de France,
BEAC’s new mandate is to pursue a low inflation (around 3%) and the maintenance of
an adequate foreign currency cover of the M2 aggregate. To hit monetary policy targets,
monetary policy instruments are set at their country-specific values because economic
integration is deficient in the CEMAC. Specifically, BEAC’s Monetary Programming
(MP) model is run at a country level to check that government credits, quantitative
targets on BEAC refinancing of commercial banks, and required reserve ratios are in
accordance with BEAC monetary targets (Honohan(1990), Iossifov et al. (2009)). For
example, the country-specific M2 aggregate is set by analyzing and extrapolating the
balance of payments’ deficit and the financial needs of the private and public sector.
CEMAC’s monetary authorities consider that MP and the declaration of BEAC’s
mandate are an improvement from the policy practice prior to 1994. Interestingly, they
shied away from using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework
from the outset because they did not want to rely on "complex econometric model with
many equations that requires reliable economic data" (BEAC (1994)). We do not deal
FZ’s monetary policy in this paper. Instead, our aim is to tackle the effects of shocks
and fiscal policy in a small open economy model where some of the most enduring
features of a FZ’s monetary policy and institutional provisions are parametrized. We
depart from estimating reduced form equations that is implicit in the MP approach and
we implement the Bayesian approach to estimate the model because it alleviates some
of the pitfalls pertaining to data scarcity and/or quality and because it is immune to the
Lucas critique2.
This is not an easy task for a FZC. In fact, since the inception of the FZ or more
recently of the CEMAC, numerous targets and instruments have been set forth, a few
of them have been enacted, albeit with various degree of compliance (Coquet et al.
(1992), IMF (2016), Nkodia (2011), Iossifov et al. (2009)). The last iteration of the
convergence criteria, which was presented in late 2015 and slated to enter in force on
January 1st 2017, relies on a three-year average formula of a set of indicators i.e. an
essentially backward looking framework. The purpose of all those convergence criteria,
which dramatically step up surveillance across the CEMAC, is to achieve a moderate
inflation in member countries and safeguard the integrity of that institutional monetary
union by seeking a sustainable level of government domestic and foreign debt.
During our estimation period, moderate inflation is mainly achieved by setting the
ceiling of monetary budget financing to ten percent of the previous year’s tax revenues.
Obviously, the implementation of administered price in many FZC dampens down na-
tionwide inflationary pressure indicator but may also biases it 3. The non-accumulation
of domestic and external payment arrears has a safe place in the three iterations of mul-
2 For example, prior distributions of unknown parameters can be used to set restrictions on their estimated
values though the related time series are not available while measurement errors in observed time series
can be partially accounted for.
3 For instance, the prices of fuels, cement or power are set by the Cameroon’s government.
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tilateral surveillance. In our model, we accommodate for the latter by using a risk pre-
mium term that translates into a higher interest rate when net foreign assets are below
their non-stochastic steady state level. For the non-accumulation of domestic arrears,
domestic banks’ lending to the government, and for that matter, to firms is modeled to
preclude non-performing loans.
Since its creation, the CFAF has been pegged to France’s currency at a fixed ex-
change rate. The fixed exchange rate feature of the FZ arrangement is captured in our
model economy by assuming the endogeneity of the base money and letting Calvo
type homogenous goods price setters use France’s inflation rate as the target inflation.
In fact, pegging the CFAF exchange rate to the Euro or whichever French currency is
per se ensuring long run inflation rate convergence between the CEMAC and France.
Moreover, the endogeneity of base money is germane to a fixed exchange rate unless
perfect sterilization is put in place.
In the CEMAC, surliquidity stemming from external financing of foreign oil-extracting
companies (Iossifov et al. (2009)), shallow financial system and failed sterilization
have been wreaking havoc on the transmission of monetary policy. CEMAC’s govern-
ments and monetary authorities primarily turn to surveillance criteria to deal with the
issue instead of fostering the reduction of participation cost, intermediation cost and
guaranteeing the enforceability of contracts to increase bank financing of firms and
households (IMF (2015)). In our model economy, excess liquidity is not addressed
head on. Instead, we set the banking finance ratio to total input costs to a very low
value.
The FZ mechanism requires each CEMAC country transfer at least 50% of its for-
eign exchange reserves to a special French Treasury account named compte d’opérations
(no less than 65% before 2007) and entrust the BEAC with the balance. We do not ac-
count for that breakdown of exchange reserves in our model economy because data are
unavailable.
For a member country of any currency union, devising an optimal fiscal policy rule
is particularly valuable because only fiscal policy instruments are available to their
governments. Owing to the fact that government expenditure and revenues data series
are sketchy for all members of the FZ, such a goal seems to have been mostly off the
radar in those countries. Therefore, the parameters of a feedback policy rule cannot
be identified in the Bayesian estimation if the related data series are missing4. At best,
one is left with using calibrated parameters to gain an insight into the effects of fiscal
policy shocks5.
For decades, FZ Monetary Authorities have been relying on country-specific annual
data to devise monetary policy because of a dearth in high frequency data and poor
economic integration among its members (Masson and Patillo (2005)). Accordingly,
we use Cameroon’s annual data to estimate a model economy that accounts for the
discussed FZ’s features and provisions.
4 Amongst FZC, Chad and Gabon have no government revenue data while others have at best ten data
points between 1979 and 2014 (World Development Indicator database).
5 Through the years, monetary policy in the Franc Zone must have been relying too on some form of
guess work or calibration.
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The small country produces a homogenous good using intermediate goods pur-
chased from monopolist producers. The homogenous good is consumed at home or
exported overseas at world prices after repackaging. Intermediate monopolist produc-
ers use labor and capital service to produce a variety of goods whose prices are set
according to a Calvo-pricing mechanism6. Importers repackage a foreign homogenous
good that is either used as a consumption or an investment good. Banks receive de-
posits from households and use them to build up reserves, purchase government bonds
and extend loans to firms. Firms use the loans to finance a fraction of their repackaging
and labor cost.
One of the findings of the paper is that technology and fiscal policy shocks ex-
plain most of the aggregate fluctuations in the country. The paper is organized in four
sections: The model is outlined in the second section and then estimated in the third
section. We comment our results in the fourth section and conclude the paper in the
fifth section.
2 The Model7
2.1 The production of the final homogenous good
The competitive producer of the domestic homogenous goodQt combines intermediate
goods of monopolist producers using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator production function
Qt =
 1
0
Q
θ−1
θ
j,t dj
 θ
θ−1
θ > 1 (1)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of domestic good
and λd ≡ θ/(θ − 1) the markup parameter in the domestic goods market. Profit maxi-
mization subject to the given prices of intermediate goods Pj,t and the market price of
the final good Pt gives the equilibrium demand for each j intermediate good Qj,t and
the domestic good’s price
Qj,t =

Pj,t
Pt
−θ
Qt (2)
Pt =
 1
0
(Pj,t)
1−θ dj
 1
1−θ
(3)
2.2 The production of intermediate goods
There is a continuum of j intermediate producers in the economy. The jth intermediate
firm combines labor, hj,t, and capital services, Kj,t, to produce Qj,t.
6 In their DSGE model for Mozambique, Peiris and Saxegaard (2007) use a Rotemberg-type quadratic
adjustment costs for price setting. Both nominal rigidity schemes are equivalent.
7 The DSGE model of a small open economy has been described in numerous papers.
Here, we adapt the model in Christiano et al. (2011).
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Qj,t = ε
q
t (Kj,t)
α (zthj,t)
1−α − φzt (4)
where zt is the permanent technology shock whose rate of growth is µz,t = zt/zt−1,
εqt a covariance stationary transitory technology shock and φ a fixed cost of production.
A fraction νf of wages is borrowed from banks. Cost minimization by the repre-
sentative intermediate producer gives two marginal cost functions
λt =
wtR
f
t
εqt (1− α)

kj,t
µz,t
α 
1
hj,t
α (5)
λt =
1
αεqt

kj,t
hj,t
α−1 
µz,t
	1−α rkt (6)
where rkt , wt and kj,t are respectively the scaled values of the rental rate of capital,
nominal wages (Wt) and capital services (Kj,t). The gross effective borrowing interest
rate is defined Rft ≡ νfRlt +

1− νf
	
where νf the fraction of wages is borrowed
from banks and, Rlt the gross lending interest rate8.
After choosing the optimal combination of labor and capital, intermediate firms
sets their price of its output in a Calvo-type friction environment. On the other hand,
firms that receive the green light to change their price choose the optimum price with
a probability (1− ξ) . Firms that are not allowed to optimize their price in the current
period adjust the previous period’s price by a factor which is a combination of the
Central Bank’s target inflation, πct , and the previous period’s inflation, πt−1.
Pt = (πt−1)
κd (πct)
1−κd Pt−1 (7)
where κd is the price indexation parameter. There is a random probability ξ that a
firm sets Pt at period t.
2.3 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed j ∈ (0, 1). The rep-
resentative household’s expected lifetime utility function is
E0
t=∞

t=0
βt

εct ln(Cj,t − hCj,t−1)−
AL
1 + σL
h1+σLj,t +
Aq
1− σq
εmt

Mcj,t+1
ztPt
1−σq
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator, Cj,t an aggregate consumption
index, hj,t the level of hours worked, Mcj,t the nominal cash holdings, β the consumer
subjective discount factor, 1/σL the Frisch labor supply elasticity and, 1/σq the in-
terest elasticity of demand for real cash balances. A degree of habit persistence in
consumption, h, is assumed. The demand for real money balance shock εmt and the
8 Stationarized variables are obtain as follows:
Nominal variables Dj,t+1,Wt, StB∗t+1, Tt and,Mcj,t+1 are divided by ztPt while real variables
Kj,t+1, Ij,t, Cj,t and ,Gj,t are scaled by zt. Low caps are used for stationarized variables.
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consumption preference shock , εct , follow an AR(1) process. It is assumed that the
household owns and operates firms and financial intermediaries, banks for short. The
budget constraint is given by
Rdt−1Dj,t+Wthj,t−R
∗
t−1Φj,t−1St−1B
∗
j,t+Πt−P
c
t Cj,t−Tt−M
c
j,t+1+M
c
j,t−
Dj,t+1 + StB
∗
j,t+1 − P
i
t Ij,t − Pt

a (uj,t)Kj,t + P
k′
t ∆t

+Rkt uj,tKj,t = 0
where Rdt−1 and R∗t−1 are the gross domestic and foreign interest rates respectively,
Dj,t is the bank deposits, B∗j,t net foreign assets (NFA), Tt the lump sum tax, St−1 the
nominal exchange rate, uj,t the level of capital utilization, Rkt the rate of return on a
unit of physical capital, P k′t the price of installed capital and Πt the sum of firms’ and
banks’ profits. The resource cost of capital utilization measured in units of physical
capital is defined as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
a (uj,t) = σa (uj,t − 1) +
σb
2
(uj,t − 1)
2
, σa, σb > 0 (8)
The risk adjustment term on NFA that ensures a well-behaved steady state equilib-
rium is given by
Φj,t = exp

−φ˜b

B∗j,t −B
∗
	
− φ˜s

R∗t −R
d
t
	
−

R∗ −Rd
		
+ φ˜
u
t

φ˜b, φ˜s > 0
(9)
where φ˜ut is an AR(1) process,B∗, R∗ andRd the non-stochastic steady state (NSS)
values of the corresponding variables9. The response to a deviation of NFA from its
NSS value precludes a Ponzi-type steady state equilibrium. The interest rate differential
accounts for free capital mobility between FZC and France and the fact that the CFAF
is pegged to a floating currency. Therefore, that interest rate differential should be
considered as a proxy of France’s uncovered interest rate parity which is transmitted to
FZC.
The law of motion for physical stock is given by
Kj,t+1 = (1− δ)Kj,t+

1− S Ij,t
Ij,t−1

Ij,t+∆j,t S (1)=S′ (1)= 0,S” (1)> 0
(10)
where the second term is the technology that transforms investment It into physi-
cal capital (Christiano et al(2001)), ∆j,t the physical capital purchased in competitive
market from other households and δ the depreciation rate of capital.
Dropping the j’s indexes, the first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to It, Kt+1,
ut, B
∗
t+1, ht, Dt+1, M
c
t+1, and Ct in stationarized form is given by
−ψz,tp
i
t + ψz,tP
k′
t

1− St − µz,tit
it−1
S′t+ βµz,t+1ψz,t+1Pk′t+1 it+1it
2 S′t+1 = 0
(11)
9 The form of the risk adjustment term used here is discussed in Christiano et al. (2011).
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ψz,t = β
ψz,t+1
µz,t+1
Rkt+1
1
πt+1
where (12)
Rkt ≡
πt
µz,tP
k′
t−1

utP
i
t a
′(u)− at (ut)P
i
t + P
k′
t (1− δ)

rkt = a
′ (uj,t) p
i
t
ψz,t − βEt

ψz,t+1
πt+1µz,t+1

R∗tΦt = 0 (13)
wt =
εhtALh
σL
t
ψz,t
(14)
−ψz,t + βEt
ψz,t+1
πt+1µz,t+1
Rdt = 0 (15)
mct+1 =

ψz,t − βEtψz,t+1
1
πt+1µ
z
t+1
Aq
−1
σq
(16)
εct(
1
ct − h
ct−1
µz,t
)− ψz,tp
c
t + βε
c
t+1Et

−h
µz,t+1ct+1 − hct

= 0 (17)
where ψz,t ≡ vtztPt marginal value of wealth in terms of one unit of the homoge-
nous domestic good at time t and vt the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
The aggregate consumption bundle is a CES function of domestic (Cdt ) and im-
ported consumption goods (Cmt ).
Ct =

(1− ωc)
1
ηc

Cdt
	 (ηc−1)
ηc + ω
1
ηc
c (C
m
t )
(ηc−1)
ηc
 ηc
(ηc−1) (18)
where ωc is the share of imports in consumption and ηc the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign good. The price of the three consumption goods P ct , Pt
andPmt , are given to the household, the domestic producers and importers respectively.
Competitive importing firms produce the imported good by transforming one-for-one
the homogenous foreign good. The domestic currency price of the homogenous foreign
good is given by Pmt = StP ∗t , where P ∗t is the foreign currency price of the homoge-
nous good. Importing firms borrow a fraction νm of their total cost from banks. The
gross interest rate on such loan is Rlt. The FOCs give the demand for the domestically
produced and imported consumption goods (cdt and cmt ):
cmt = ωc (q
e
tR
m
t )
−ηc ct (19)
cdt = (1− ωc)

1
pct
−ηc
ct (20)
where qet ≡
StP
∗
t
Pct
is the real exchange rate, St the nominal exchange rate and
Rmt ≡ ν
mRlt + (1− ν
m). The relative price of the consumption good is given by
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pct =

(1− ωc) + ωc ∗ (p
m
t )
1−ηc
 1
1−ηc (21)
where the relative price of the imported consumption good is defined by pmt ≡
qetp
c
tR
m
t . The consumer inflation index computed from (21) is
πct ≡ πt

(1− ωc) + ωc ∗ (p
m
t )
1−ηc
(1− ωc) + ωc ∗

pmt−1
	1−ηc
 1
1−ηc
(22)
A representative competitive firm produces the aggregate investment good using the
domestically produced homogenous good and imported investment good in production
function.
Similarly to the aggregate consumption good, the FOCs for a CES investment bun-
dle given P it , Pt andPmt gives the demand for the domestically produced and imported
investment goods (idt and imt )
imt = ωi (q
e
tR
m
t )
−ηi it (23)
idt = (1− ωi)

1
pit
−ηi
it (24)
where the investment price index pit is given by
pit =

(1− ωi) + ωi ∗ (p
m
t )
1−ηi
 1
1−ηi (25)
The relative price of the imported input is denoted by pmt ≡ qetpctRmt and the in-
vestment inflation index is given by
πit ≡ πt

(1− ωi) + ωi ∗ (pmt )
1−ηi
(1− ωi) + ωi ∗

pmt−1
	1−ηi
 1
1−ηi
(26)
2.4 The banking sector
The representative household’s depositsDt are used to finance loans to firms (Swt ), lend
to the government (Bbkg,t) and build up reserves (Rbkt ). The balance sheet constraint of
banks is given by
Dt = B
bk
g,t + S
w
t +R
bk
t (27)
Banks’ reserves do not earn interest. However, reserves are held because should
banking activities of deposit-taking and lending end up with a shortage of reserves in
one bank, it would be costly to get cash from other banks or more likely from the
Central Bank in the case of a FZC. Therefore, we assume that only excess reserves are
lent. Denoting the rate of required reserves on deposits by ηres, the amount of excess
reserves that can be lent is
(1− ηres)Dt = B
bk
g,t + S
w
t (28)
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The representative bank receives interest payments from firm and the government
and pay out interest on household deposits. Those transactions generate a profit at some
cost. We assume a quadratic cost where all variables are contemporaneously dated
because we do not deal with non-performing loans. Each period, the representative
bank chooses Bbkg,t, and Swt to maximize its profit Πbkt subject to its balance sheet
constraint
Πbkt = r
g
tB
bk
g,t + r
l
tS
w
t − r
d
tDt −
1
2
δbk

αbkbgB
bk
g,t + αswS
w
t
	2 (29)
where δbk is a scale parameter, αbkbg and αsw cost parameters, rgt the lending
interest rates to the government and rlt the lending interest rate to firms. The FOCs
give the following scaled loan to the government (or demand for government bonds)
and loan supply to firms
rgt =
rdt
(1− ηres)
+
δbkα2bkbg
µz,tπt
bbkg,t −

δbkαbkbgαsw

swt (30)
rlt =
rdt
(1− ηres)
+ δbkαswαbkbg
bbkg,t
µz,tπt
− δbkα2sws
w
t (31)
2.5 The government
Government resources come from new interest-bearing debt, a lump sum tax (Tt) and
new cash injection by the Central Bank. Those resources are used to consume domesti-
cally produced goods (Gt) and service government debt (Bbkg,t). Thus, the government’s
flow constraint may be written as
Bbkg,t+1 = Gt +R
g
tB
bk
g,t − Tt − λ
FZTt−1 (32)
where Rgt is the gross interest rate on government debt held by banks and λFZ the
monetary union’s parameter10. Public spending and lump sum tax are AR(1) processes.
Tt = ξ
T
t

T
	1−ρT (Tt−1)ρT (33)
Gt = ξ
T
t

G
	1−ρG (Gt−1)ρG (34)
where T = ηTQ and G = ηGQ and Q the NSS level of output.
2.6 The Central Bank
The FZ mechanism requires each CEMAC member state transfer a fraction of its for-
eign exchange reserves to the French Treasury and entrust the BEAC with the balance.
The rationale for pooling foreign exchange reserves in a monetary union is well doc-
umented. Nevertheless, several member states are reluctant to entrust the BEAC with
reserves that are not earmarked for CEMAC pooling arrangement (IMF (2013)). We
omit that breakdown of exchange reserves in our model.
10 According to the FZ Agreement, monetary finance of government’s deficit cannot exceed 20% of pre-
vious period collected tax.
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Setting capital gain on foreign exchange reserves to zero, the quasi-fiscal surplus,
SCBKt , of the Central Bank is given by
SCBKt = St∆CBXRt+1 −∆MBt+1 (35)
where CBXRt is the country’s foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank, MBt
the monetary base which is the sum of currency held by the household, Mct , and re-
serves held by the banking sector in the vaults of the Central Bank (Rbkt .) The flow
constraint pertaining to the country is obtained by equalizing the quasi-fiscal surplus to
difference between Central Bank’s "expenditures" and earnings (Agenor and Montiel
(1996)). Here, it is given by
StCBXRt+1 − St−1CBXRt −∆MBt+1 = i
∗FZ
t−1 St−1CBXRt − λ
FZTt−1 (36)
where i∗FZt−1 is the interest rate received on foreign exchange reserves, whose gross
value R∗FZt is assumed to follow an AR(1)11.
2.7 Aggregation and Resource constraints
The model is closed by the equilibria of the domestic good market and the balance of
payments.
The domestically produced good is transformed one for one by exporters. There-
fore, the domestic good market equilibrium is given by
Qt = C
d
t + I
d
t +Gt + a (uj,t)Kt +

Rxt
qet p
c
t
−ηx
Y ∗t (37)
where Y ∗t is the foreign output, ηx the export elasticity with respect to the relative
price of exports. The unit cost of a borrowed capital is defined by
Rxt ≡ ν
xRlt + (1− ν
x) , where νx the fraction of borrowed repackaging cost by
exporting firms.
The change in the country’s foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank equals
net capital flows from abroad
St∆CBXRt+1=

Rxt

Rxt
qet p
c
t
−ηx
Y ∗t + StB
∗
t+1 + i
∗FZ
t−1 St−1CBXRt

(38)
−

qetp
c
tR
m
t C
m
t + q
e
tp
c
tI
m
t + r
∗
t−1Φt−1St−1B
∗
t + St−1B
∗
t

2.8 Shocks
Twelve stochastic exogenous variables are included in the model. There are two tech-
nology shocks: a neutral technology stationary shock εqt and a labor neutral technology
shock zt whose growth rate µz,t is a stationary AR(1) process. On the demand side,
11 Interest rates applicable to different deposit brackets are provided in Veyrune (2007)
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there is a consumption preference shock εct and demand for real money balance shock
εmt . Two fiscal policy shocks are included: - the government spending shock (G) and
the lump-sum tax shock (T ). Monetary policy related shocks include the inflation target
shock (πtc), the interest rate on foreign reserves shock (R∗FZt ), the nominal exchange
rate shock (st) and the banks’ reserves (Rbkt ). A foreign inflation shock (π∗) and a
risk premium shock on foreign assets interest rate εut complete the set of exogenous
stochastic variables. In the model, all shocks are defined by an AR(1)
ειt = ξ
ι
t (ε
ι)
1−ρει

ειt−1
	ρει (39)
where ι denotes any of the above shocks, ρει its persistence and ξιt its related
covariance stationary component whose prior distribution is given in Table 1.
3 Estimation of the model
3.1 Estimation methodology
The model is estimated using the Bayesian technique. First, a stationarized log-linear
version of the model is computed and then it is used to find its log-linear approxima-
tion in the steady state’s neighborhood. A state-space representation of the transformed
model helps compute the likelihood function of the model that is needed to find the
posterior density of the estimated parameters. Let Γ be the parameter vector to be esti-
mated, Λ a sample of data and M the model. The posterior density of the parameters,
P (Γ|Λ,M) , is given by Bayes formula
P (Γ|Λ,M) =
P (Λ|Γ,M)P (Γ|M)
P (Λ|Γ,M)P (Γ|M) dΓ
(40)
The denominator is the marginal data density which gives some clue on the average
model fit to the data. In the numerator, prior beliefs about parameters values given
the model, P (Γ|M) , is updated by the data information contained in the likelihood
function of the model P (Λ|Γ,M) . The Metropolis-Hasting procedure of selecting a
vector draw Γ∗ enables the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to generate
a chain of the posterior P (Γ|Λ,M) 12.
Here, we heavily rely on theory to choose our priors given in Table 1 because, to
our knowledge, there is no empirical work pertaining to Cameroon in the Bayesian
framework. Not for that matter is one for any FZC. So the Inverse Gamma distribu-
tion is used to describe the motion of standard deviation of shocks. Next, parameters
whose values are expected to fall between 0 and 1 are assumed to follow a Beta distri-
bution while those which are restricted to be positive follow a Gamma distribution13.
The parameter estimates (posteriors) are computed numerically with MCMC method
consisting of two separate chains using Dynare (Adjemian et al.(2011)).
12 Fernandez-Villarverde (2010) gives a theoretical account of the challenges and opportunities of Bayesian
techniques.
13 Del Negro and Schorffheide (2006) provide a discussion on priors.
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3.2 Data
Aside from monetary aggregates and interest rates, FZ’s monetary institutions do not
collect high-frequency data. Consequently, the state of the art monetary policy frame-
work to date, the so-called MP, uses annual country by country data to fine-tune country
specific monetary policy. We yield to those constraints and estimate our model econ-
omy using Cameroon’s annual data over 1979-2014.
The domestic observable time series are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), for-
eign exchange reserves, money, consumption, the deposit interest rate, capital stock,
bank deposits, the consumer price inflation and claims on the private sector by banks.
Italy’s export unit price index is used as a proxy for the price of foreign good because
it is among Cameroon’s main trading partners. The one year US deposit Libor is used
to proxy the international interest rate14.
3.3 Fixed parameters
We calibrate a subset of the model’s parameters. In order to set the fraction of input
costs that are borrowed from local banks, we take our cue from two pieces of infor-
mation. First, Iossifov and al. (2009) find that while the highly capital-intensive oil
sector is the main economic sector in CEMAC oil producers, oil is chiefly extracted by
foreign companies. Those companies eschew local financing because they can turn to
international banks or credit markets to secure funds for investment. Second, a report
from the IMF (2015a)) notes that banks hold large amounts of excess reserves because
of the lack of safe lending opportunities, the absence of trust among interbank mar-
ket participants and of appropriate sterilization policy. We account for those facts by
setting the fraction of borrowed funds by intermediate good producers, exporters and
importers to 0.01 (νf = νx = νm = 0.01). Banks’ reserves requirement ηres is fixed
to 0.10. We set the ratio of government revenue and expenditure to GDP to the average
value computed from available years of data (ηT = 0.11, ηG = 0.12). We assume that
the budget stance does not require a monetary finance up to the 20% ceiling of previous
year’s revenue at all time and we set λFZ to its median value at 0.10. Owing to the
low average real per capita growth rate of 0.08% and to obtain the average value of
the interest rate in equilibrium, the subjective discount factor β is calibrated at 0.99.
A few parameters that have proven to be difficult to identify are also fixed: the capital
utilization cost parameters (σa = 0.05, σb = 0.015), the rate of depreciation of cap-
ital (δbk = 0.05), the export elasticity ηx = 1.5, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
(σL = 1) and the parameter controlling the deviation of net foreign assets from its
equilibrium value (φ˜b = 0.01).
3.4 Empirical results
Priors’ and posteriors’ parameter values are shown in Table 1, along with the 90%
interval range of posterior parameters. The price indexation parameter κd is 0.56. It
implies that non optimizing firms give more weight to previous year’s inflation when
14 Money and Libor series are extracted from International Financial Statistics (IMF). The stock of capital
is extracted from Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al.(2015)). All other series are retrieved from the World
Development Indicators database (The World Bank).
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they set their current price. The Calvo proportion of firms that do not re-optimize
ξ is 0.22, suggesting and expected lifetime of price of 1.29 year. The elasticities of
substitution between domestic and imported goods are respectively ηc = 2.36 for con-
sumption goods and ηi = 0.05 for investment goods. Therefore, households can more
easily replace some of the imported consumption goods whereas firms have a hard time
substituting imported investment goods with domestic investment goods because they
are mostly poor substitutes when they exist. The posterior shares of imported goods
in consumption (ωc = 0.08) and in investment (ωi = 0.55) corroborate the different
degrees of substitutability highlighted by estimated demand elasticities. The share of
capital income α is 0.31. While the extractive firms heavily use high-productivity cap-
ital service, the service and agricultural sectors are labor intensive sectors. Therefore,
the labor’s share should be lower than the share of capital service. The posterior elas-
ticity of substitution between varieties of domestic goods (θ) implies a 3% mark-up in
the domestic goods market. That value is much lower than those found in advanced
economies - above 10% - where there are arguably many more ways to differentiate
goods (PMG (2016)). The risk adjustment parameter φ˜s is positive at 1.78, implying a
lower premium on net foreign asset when interest rate differential is positive. It follows
that if the deviation of the domestic interest from its NSS level is bigger than its for-
eign counterpart, the risk adjustment term Φt will be increasing to prompt the country
to reduce its foreign liabilities. The posterior lending cost parameters αbkbg and αsw
are respectively 0.16 and 0.17. The cost structure precludes failures which is in accor-
dance with domestic banks’ low risk appetite. Local banks lend to firms only if the risk
of failure is as low as that incurred when lending to the government. The estimate for
habit persistence h is 0.82.
The range for AR(1) persistence estimate for all shocks is 0.57 − 0.98 though all
priors values are set to 0.85. The persistence of government expenditure and revenue
shocks are on the low side of the range, respectively 0.69 and 0.57. It shows that
monetary policy is biased towards the integrity of the FZ monetary union even though
it is fine-tuned by country. Therefore, national fiscal policy should be flexible enough
(low persistence) to accommodate the contingency of monetary policies that are set
by the supranational monetary authorities. The highest shock persistence is obtained
for the nominal exchange rate shock. This outcome is expected because of the fixed
exchange rate between France’s currency and the common currency of the FZ. Since
its inception many decades ago, the parity was changed only once, in 1994.
The lowest standard deviation is estimated for the risk premium shock σφ˜u and the
largest for target inflation σεπc . There seems to be no proportional effects of those
shocks on macroeconomic fluctuations as technology and fiscal shocks are shown to
matter the most from variance decomposition.
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Table 1: Priors and posteriors (InGa: Inverse Gamma)
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Density Mean Std.Dev Mode Std.Dev 90% Interval
ξ Calvo probability of no price reoptimization Beta 0.2 0.02 0.222 0.022 0.192 0.265
κd Price indexation parameter Beta 0.51 0.05 0.56 0.047 0.491 0.644
α Elasticity of output to capital Beta 0.34 0.03 0.313 0.02 0.274 0.34
AL Constant in the demand for labor Gamma 4 0.4 4.265 0.393 3.71 4.884
Aq Constant in the demand for real money Beta 0.75 0.08 0.766 0.071 0.623 0.857
h Habit persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.869 0.033 0.823 0.933
ηc Elasticity of subst. between imported and domestic cons. good Gamma 3.2 0.32 2.360 0.235 2.043 2.8
ηi Elasticity of subst. between imported and domestic inv. good Gamma 0.05 0.005 0.049 0.005 0.042 0.057
ωc Share of imported consumption Beta 0.10 0.01 0.097 0.008 0.085 0.113
ωi Share of imported capital investment Beta 0.60 0.06 0.543 0.025 0.515 0.595
σq Demand for money curvature parameter Gamma 10 1 9.975 1.018 8.393 11.8
θ Elasticity of substitution between varieties of domestic goods Gamma 31 3 32.901 3.303 28.35 39.23
αbkbg Bank’s cost parameter relative to government bond Beta 0.2 0.02 0.198 0.02 0.164 0.229
αsw Bank’s cost parameter relative to firms’ loans Beta 0.2 0.02 0.199 0.019 0.168 0.23
φ˜s Risk adjustment parameter Gamma 1.25 0.1 1.779 0.092 1.632 1.937
ρεπ∗ Foreign inflation persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.978 0.014 0.949 0.991
ρεq Stationary output shock persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.91 0.043 0.851 0.998
ρπc Target inflation persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.878 0.032 0.820 0.926
ρεc Consumption shock persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.777 0.114 0.585 0.948
ρεm Money shock persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.867 0.06 0.759 0.952
ρφ˜u Risk premium shock persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.87 0.081 0.718 0.957
ρµz Trend growth shock persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.712 0.068 0.599 0.818
ρT Government revenue persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.574 0.056 0.487 0.673
ρG Government expenditure persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.69 0.048 0.608 0.763
ρεS Nominal exchange rate persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.977 0.025 0.922 0.992
ρ
εR
∗FZ Interest rate on reserves persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.815 0.049 0.720 0.883
ρεbkr Bank reserves persistence Beta 0.85 0.075 0.886 0.069 0.750 0.963
σεπ∗ Size of foreign inflation shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.085 0.011 0.073 0.109
σεq Size of Stationary output shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.113 0.018 0.089 0.146
σεπc Size of Target inflation shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 1.38 0.396 1.006 2.284
σεc Size of Consumption shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.412 0.174 0.237 0.736
σφ˜u Size of risk premium shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.068 0.007 0.059 0.081
σεµz Size of the trend growth shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.091 0.013 0.075 0.12
σεT Size of the government revenue shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.102 0.015 0.083 0.132
σεG Size of the government expenditure shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.088 0.014 0.073 0.116
σεS Size of the nominal exchange rate shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.724 0.123 0.528 0.924
σ
εR
∗FZ Size of the interest rate on reserves shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.147 0.024 0.119 0.199
σεbkr Size of Bank reserves shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.23 0.377 0.111 1.117
σεm Size of money shock InGa 0.5 ∞ 0.162 0.022 0.133 0.202
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4 Economic implications
The economic implications of the model are analyzed along two dimensions. We first
look at shocks that are driving macroeconomic fluctuations by examining the variance
decomposition. Second, we assess the transmission mechanisms in our setup by ex-
amining the impulse response functions of a one percent shock on a selected aggregate
variables.
4.1 Variance decomposition
Table 2 shows the relative contribution of selected shocks to the forecast error variance
of aggregate variables for 1, 2, 5 years horizon. Looking at output, investment, hours,
net exports and net foreign assets, it can be noticed that macroeconomic fluctuations
and the external accounts are mainly driven by four shocks: the permanent technology
shock, the transitory technology shock, and fiscal policy shocks. In the first year (Table
2a), the permanent technology shock only affects investment, net foreign assets and net
export. In the second year (Table 2b), only hours worked do not show an increasing
contribution of the permanent technology shock. The bulk of their fluctuations is ex-
plained by government expenditure and taxes. In a five-year horizon (Table 2c), fiscal
policy and permanent technology shocks are the main sources of fluctuations for the
selected variables.
Owing to the CFAF pegging to France’s currency and to the interest payments on a
fraction of Cameroon’s foreign exchange reserves by the French Treasury, it is perhaps
useful look into the contribution of shocks on those variables to aggregate fluctuations.
Using an arbitrary threshold of 10%, Table 2a and 2b show that a shock on the related
interest rate has a sizeable contribution in a one to two years horizon. During that time,
banks’ loan to firms and to the government, households’ deposits, net foreign assets
and of course foreign exchange reserves are the aggregates that are affected the most
by the reserves’ interest rate shock. Using the same 10%-threshold for the effects of a
nominal exchange rate shock, Table 2c and 2d show that its contribution is potent on
government debt, inflation and net foreign asset only above a 5-year horizon.
Overall, the variance decomposition findings are consistent with Hoffmaister et al
(1997) as far as output growth is concerned. They estimate a structural VAR containing
five variables to assess the sources of output growth fluctuations in a sample of FZC
and non-FZC from sub-Saharan Africa. Using two balanced panels of annual observa-
tions from 1971 to 1993, they find that domestic shocks (supply, fiscal and nominal)
explain more of the output fluctuations than foreign shocks (terms of trade or trade
balance and world interest rate) in FZC. However, our contribution extends their work
because the DSGE model dramatically increases the set of variables, shocks and struc-
tural parameters to be reckoned with.
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Table 2a: Forecast error variance decomposition period 1 (in %, computed at the posterior
mean)
ξqt ξ
πc
t ξ
c
t ξ
µz
t ξ
G
t ξ
T
t ξ
s
t ξ
R∗FZ
t Total
inflation 10.18 6.19 2.31 6.07 46.60 28.00 0.59 0.02 100
money 14.17 2.39 1.23 15.94 34.64 20.61 3.31 6.73 100
Government debt 26.82 1.56 1.91 27.38 17.17 5.58 5.45 14.06 100
Firms’ debt 10.92 35.86 2.86 9.41 23.79 10.72 5.90 0.51 100
Deposit 25.38 1.14 1.17 28.18 17.37 6.44 7.09 13.18 100
Labor 4.53 1.62 0.03 2.12 50.76 39.96 0.70 0.24 100
Wage 3.40 14.88 0.54 22.59 35.29 21.03 2.00 0.24 100
Rate of return on capital 15.66 2.32 1.27 15.94 34.06 20.15 3.45 7.12 100
Real rental rate of capital 6.69 0.40 1.48 1.38 52.99 36.41 0.29 0.31 100
Output 6.04 2.89 4.48 0.99 53.95 31.32 0.21 0.08 100
Consumption 2.65 0.02 28.56 50.93 10.29 7.35 0.05 0.16 100
Investment 0.18 0.23 0.98 27.10 40.16 30.15 0.35 0.82 100
RER 7.49 0.08 1.58 0.62 53.52 36.24 0.17 0.26 100
Net Foreign Assets 11.56 1.59 0.81 12.72 35.21 23.02 2.25 11.89 100
Foreign exchange reserves 0.84 2.90 0.85 30.11 21.28 16.49 7.29 18.74 100
Capital stock 0.03 0.03 0.15 87.60 6.86 5.15 0.05 0.13 100
Net export
Output
17.61 4.70 1.51 47.96 16.32 9.88 1.24 0.77 100
Computed at the posterior mean
Table 2b: Forecast error variance decomposition period 2 (in %, computed at the posterior
mean)
ξqt ξ
πc
t ξ
c
t ξ
µz
t ξ
G
t ξ
T
t ξ
s
t ξ
R∗FZ
t Total
inflation 12.08 2.56 1.37 13.85 34.87 20.46 13.13 1.66 100
money 12.50 1.86 1.15 12.78 35.12 21.44 5.01 9.64 100
Government debt 29.70 1.00 2.68 27.21 18.37 5.21 8.52 7.24 100
Firms’ debt 12.33 15.03 3.50 30.31 12.78 6.59 3.60 15.85 100
Deposit 28.07 0.74 1.59 28.46 18.21 6.02 9.33 7.54 100
Labor 4.95 1.09 1.80 7.72 45.08 35.38 3.74 0.19 100
Wage 13.43 11.07 0.40 17.45 26.20 15.71 1.39 14.32 100
Rate of return on capital 13.41 1.79 1.21 12.75 34.75 21.11 5.15 9.79 100
Real rental rate of capital 5.76 0.28 1.34 3.06 1.92 36.13 1.08 0.39 100
Output 3.51 1.57 5.36 17.03 42.62 26.45 0.11 3.32 100
Consumption 4.08 0.01 27.33 52.91 8.88 6.49 0.06 0.22 100
Investment 0.31 0.18 0.90 29.75 38.84 29.46 0.17 0.36 100
RER 5.97 0.12 1.50 2.64 52.20 35.97 0.87 0.68 100
Net Foreign Assets 9.13 3.81 0.78 10.02 35.71 25.06 1.96 12.25 100
Foreign exchange reserves 2.24 1.68 1.35 20.64 30.69 21.99 4.68 15.22 100
Capital stock 0.08 0.04 0.23 80.68 10.70 8.12 0.05 0.10 100
Net export
Output
9.49 1.86 1.15 38.72 25.94 19.08 1.48 2.26 100
Computed at the posterior mean
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Table 2c: Forecast error variance decomposition period 5 (in %, computed at the posterior
mean)
ξqt ξ
πc
t ξ
c
t ξ
µz
t ξ
G
t ξ
T
t ξ
s
t ξ
R∗FZ
t Total
inflation 11.07 1.93 1.09 12.07 36.77 22.67 11.28 3.10 100
money 11.36 1.78 1.07 12.16 36.05 22.75 4.81 9.21 100
Government debt 31.91 0.59 4.42 23.49 18.18 5.01 11.29 5.01 100
Firms’ debt 9.57 4.95 5.48 42.13 18.27 12.95 1.25 5.37 100
Deposit 30.81 0.49 2.55 26.32 17.40 5.43 10.95 5.97 100
Labor 7.88 0.76 12.41 16.51 33.30 25.71 2.83 0.57 100
Wage 27.63 9.06 0.36 16.91 20.81 12.52 1.08 11.61 100
Rate of return on capital 12.12 1.72 1.14 12.18 35.91 22.61 4.93 9.37 100
Real rental rate of capital 3.93 0.20 1.12 11.28 47.98 34.31 0.75 0.40 100
Output 3.50 0.66 6.46 31.47 33.56 23.00 0.08 1.24 100
Consumption 7.63 0.02 24.22 54.68 7.60 5.75 0.02 0.07 100
Investment 0.65 0.08 0.75 32.27 37.33 28.66 0.12 0.11 100
RER 4.09 0.11 1.41 9.85 48.74 34.57 0.63 0.56 100
Net Foreign Assets 17.50 3.46 1.08 17.50 23.92 15.72 13.41 6.15 100
Foreign exchange reserves 4.74 1.61 2.14 10.33 39.59 26.72 5.93 7.68 100
Capital stock 0.26 0.04 0.35 66.16 18.70 14.37 0.06 0.03 100
Net export
Output
2.63 0.39 0.51 33.84 34.75 26.88 0.48 0.50 100
Computed at the posterior mean
4.2 Impulse responses
The variance decompositions have shown that technology and fiscal policy shocks ac-
count for the bulk of aggregate fluctuations in the economy. We next examine the
impulse response functions (IRFs) of one-percent size of those shocks to shed light on
the propagation mechanism in the economy.
4.2.1 Permanent technology shock
Graph 1a shows the IRFs for a 1-percent positive permanent shock to technology.
Hours, capital service, investment along with output decline from first to fifth year from
where they move to their respective new NSS level. Aside from output, the decline of
those aggregates is broadly consistent with the extreme case of fixed money supply,
short run price stickiness and a demand for money that obeys to the quantity theory.
In such a case, output must be constant and firms, that must produce the same amount
with less inputs, reduce their investment (Basu et al (2004))15. In contrast to the latter
theoretical case, output is not constant because monetary policy is more accommoda-
tive in order to mitigate the effects of a positive technology shock as the IRF of money
shows.
Real wage rises initially then falls a year later before starting to revert to its new
NSS. The revenue effect dominates in the first year only as real wage increase leads
to a fall of labor supply. Aggregate consumption declines throughout the adjustment
15 It is worth recalling that Franc Zone’s monetary policy successive frameworks have been inspired by
the quantity theory, including their latest Monetary Programming model.
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process. The decline in aggregate consumption and the time profile of investment re-
sults in a trade balance surplus and an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
4.2.2 Transitory technology shock
The IRFs for a 1-percent positive transitory shock to technology is shown on Graph
1b. Firms need more time to adjust labor to its initial NSS level than capital service
(more than 15 years vs 5 years) because of the time profile of their prices. The real
rental rate of capital reverts to its initial NSS level in 5 years while the real wage
needs almost 15 years to do so. Interestingly, after an initial fall, output overshoots its
NSS level in the second year and converges to that level from above. The transitory
technology shock results in an increase in output, consumption and investment that
prompts monetary authorities to adopt a more restrictive policy to cool inflation off
and obligates the government to seek bank financing to fulfill its budget constraint. In
that respect, from the first to the fifth year, the IRFs show that money and the consumer
price inflation move sideways to reach their initial NSS levels while government’s bank
debt decreases from beginning to end after an initial positive jump. The country’s net
foreign assets and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves improve along with the
reversion of the trade balance to its initial NSS level.
4.2.3 Government expenditure shock
Government spending falls on domestic good only. So, output jumps the instant a
one-percent shock hits government expenditure (Graph 1c). Firms instantly adjust to
the new output level by substituting labor with capital service. Initially, the revenue
effect dominates the substitution effect in the households’ labor-leisure but starting
from the second year, the substitution effect prevails though firms still prefer to use
more capital in their production process. A hump-shape aggregate investment results
from this shock, with a peak in the fifth year. The IRFs of consumption, net export, net
foreign assets and foreign exchange reserves show that investment is the driving force
behind the country external accounts. In effect, upon investment peak, net foreign
assets stabilizes and foreign exchange loss starts to improve. Monetary finance is the
main financing source of the government’s budget until money reverts to its initial NSS
in the fifth year. Interestingly, after a government expenditure shock, there is no surge
in the consumer price inflation which reverts to its NSS level from below.
4.2.4 Government revenue shock
The IRFs of a 1-percent shock on government revenue is accompanied by an instanta-
neous fall in resources available for firms and households. Both the rate of return on
investment in a unit of physical capital and the real rental rate of capital rise but the
latter rises more (Graph 1d). Firms are compelled to use more labor than capital ser-
vice. To recoup tax losses stemming from the shock, households supply more labor at
a lower wage rate though and also reduce their consumption. The fall in consumption
and investment (because of the wedge between cost and return in capital) leads to a
fall in output. Consumer price inflation rises because firms pass on a fraction of the
higher input cost to consumers thanks to price stickiness. Monetary authorities sharply
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decrease government’s monetary finance. From the external account standpoint, there
is an initial decline in imports which is milder than that of consumption or investment,
hence the small trade balance deficit and the loss in net foreign assets. Starting from
the second year, all variables gradually revert to their initial NSS level.
5 Conclusion
We have estimated a DSGE model of a small open economy that accounts for some
of the FZ’s most enduring features and provisions using the Bayesian method and
Cameroon’s data over the period 1979-2014. We find that technology shocks- tran-
sitory and permanent- and fiscal policy shocks are the driving force behind macroeco-
nomic fluctuations in the country. A permanent technology shock and a tax revenue
shock are both contractionary whereas a transitory technology shock and a government
spending both lead to an output expansion. In the data, Cameroon’s average real growth
per capita is barely positive during our estimation period, suggesting that the country
is mostly buffeted by shocks whose contractionary effects are long-lasting. Transitory
technology and tax revenue shocks are inflationary. Foreign exchange accumulation is
hampered by a positive shock on government expenditure. Overall, our findings sug-
gest that FZ membership require Cameroon to elaborate and implement a very sound
fiscal policy because of their sizeable effects on the economy. In addition, the current
negative effect of permanent technology shock on aggregate fluctuations suggests that
a brand new growth strategy is much needed to thrive in that monetary union.
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Graph 1: The impulse response functions (IRFs.)
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Graph 1a: Permanent technology shock IRFs (basis point on the y-axis)



Graph 1b: Transitory technology shock IRFs (basis point on the y-axis)


Graph1c: Government expenditure shock IRFs (basis point on the y-axis)



Graph 1d: Government revenue shock IRFs (basis point on the y-axis)



